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INTRODUCTION
One sentiment about the government’s contemporary approach
to corporate crime holds that prosecutors have been protective of
their enormous, largely unreviewable charging discretion and have
appeared to act imperiously and without a sufficient sense of
accountability from one case to the next.1 This view is most commonly
* © 2018 Samuel W. Buell.
** Bernard M. Fishman Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.
buell@law.duke.edu. Many thanks to Miriam Baer and the Honorable Jed Rakoff for
helpful comments and criticisms and to Alexandra Dayneka for excellent research
assistance.
1. See, e.g., A Mammoth Guilt Trip, ECONOMIST (Aug. 28, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21614101-corporate-america-finding-it-ever-harderstay-right-side-law-mammoth-guilt [https://perma.cc/AZD5-KJUV] (condemning the
profiteering nature of the government’s prosecution of private companies, the clandestine
nature of the settlements, and the manner in which the government inserts itself into these
companies’ decision-making structure, all of which contribute to vagueness in the law on
this matter); The Criminalisation of American Business, ECONOMIST (Aug. 28, 2014),
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21614138-companies-must-be-punished-when-
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held among corporations and their counsel but has also been
expressed, in more measured tones, by academic critics of the
Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) corporate prosecution program.2
While hankering for legislative reform, critics have persistently called
for more transparency and less secrecy in corporate prosecutions,
often without exploring what that might entail.3
It might be illuminating to flip this sort of claim on its head.
Instead of asking, “Why do prosecutors act so arrogant and
unaccountable?” one might ask, “Why do they say so much and why
do they seem so insecure about their accountability?” In other words,
if prosecutors hold all the cards when it comes to corporate
prosecutions, why do they show so many of them?
American prosecutors, it should be remembered, are not
obligated to say anything about their cases unless and until they go to
court to present those cases at a trial. Even then, there is no
requirement for public explanation but simply the reality that they
must say something, or at least call a witness, to satisfy their burden of
proof. Indeed, standards of professional conduct differentiate
prosecutors from other lawyers, including other criminal lawyers, by
restricting their freedom to speak and warning against the particular
danger that prosecutorial utterances can pose to fairness in the
criminal process.4 The routine American prosecution process is filled

they-do-wrong-legal-system-has-become-extortion
[https://perma.cc/X6ZQ-F2PA]
(criticizing the increasing prevalence of the government’s bringing criminal prosecutions
against private companies and the secrecy behind the non-prosecution settlements of
those cases).
2. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and
the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1326 (2013); Michael
Patrick Wilt, Who Watches the Watchmen? Accountability in Federal Corporate Criminal
Prosecution Agreements, 43 AM. J. CRIM. L. 61, 65 (2015); see also Russell Mokhiber,
Crime Without Conviction: The Rise of Deferred and Non Prosecution Agreements, CORP.
CRIME REP. (Dec. 28, 2005), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm
[https://perma.cc/7MFT-76V7].
3. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CAN JUSTICE BE ACHIEVED THROUGH
SETTLEMENTS? 3 (2015), http://files.transparency.org/content/download/1917/12678/file
/2015_PolicyBrief1_Settlements_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/UF4X-N2JU]. But see Brandon
L. Garrett, The Public Interest in Corporate Settlements, 48–52 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research, Working Paper No. 2017-03, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2904035 [https://perma.cc/63YW-NAF5] (proposing various forms of
judicial and legislative oversight).
4. See AM. BAR ASSOC., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION § 3-1.10 (4th ed. 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice
/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition.html [https://perma.cc/U6G4-S8JM]; see
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 1-7.400 (2017)
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-1-7000-media-relations#1-7.400 [https://perma.cc/R6GT6KP2].
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with secrecy, from grand jury proceedings to the opacity of charging
decisions to the absence of public justification for plea bargains.5
Defense lawyers are far less strictly regulated in what they can
say outside court and are sometimes counseled, particularly in highprofile cases, to aggressively “try the case in the press.”6 Meanwhile,
criminal defense attorneys usually would prefer that prosecutors keep
their mouths shut and their court filings terse, and they readily accuse
prosecutors of misconduct for engaging in florid or overly revealing
conversation about a case prior to trial.7
In the always exceptional sub-field of corporate crime, however,
the situation is the opposite. It is now routine practice for the DOJ,
when prosecuting corporations or settling criminal charges with them,
to speak loudly, often, and at length about what it is doing and why.8
The standard large corporate settlement includes, at a minimum: a
lengthy “speaking” indictment or information, or in its stead a
substantively equivalent “statement of facts,” that details both the
underlying violations of law and the corporation’s response to those
violations (or lack thereof); a plea or settlement agreement that
explains the measures that will be taken by the corporation to redress
any harm and bolster efforts to prevent future wrongdoing; and a
press release or press conference at which government officials
announce the penalties in the case and justify the nature of any legal
action and settlement.9
As this process for prosecuting corporations has grown and
become more routinized over the last two decades, the defense bar
has had little to say about it other than that prosecutors should be
5. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Transparency & Participation in Criminal
Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911 (2006) (discussing the lack of transparency and publicity
in the prosecutorial system).
6. See John C. Watson, Litigation Public Relations: The Lawyers’ Duty to Balance
News Coverage of Their Clients, 7 COMM. L & POL’Y 77, 88 (2002).
7. See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 262 (1993); United States v. Grace,
401 F. Supp. 2d. 1057, 1058 (D. Mont. 2005).
8. See, e.g., Rule 11 Plea Agreement, United States v. Takata Corp., No. 2:16-CR20810 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/926051
/download [https://perma.cc/K565-VMW2] (discussing the investigation of defective
airbags); Letter from Robert L. Capers, U.S. Attorney, E. Dist. of N.Y., & Andrew
Weissmann, Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Mark F. Mendelsohn, Esquire (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/911206/download [https://perma.cc/F5Y9-Z9ER]
(discussing a non-prosecution agreement in an investigation of quid pro quo hiring of
relatives of Chinese officials and potential clients).
9. For an extensive public collection of corporate criminal settlements, see Brandon
L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Prosecution Registry: About, UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF
LAW,
http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-prosecution-registry/about.html
[https://perma.cc/J6YB-4K8G].
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disclosing even more. A common complaint directed at the DOJ is
that it exercises far too much discretion in this realm and wields its
power too opaquely and unpredictably. 10 Short of legislation to
reform the law of corporate criminal liability, firms and their lawyers
would keenly like the DOJ to be more explicit about how it intends to
exercise its discretion—who is likely to be charged for what, what
sorts of settlement agreements and penalties might be on or off the
table, and what sort of corporate conduct is likely to lead to less or
more favorable outcomes for firms.
These calls have been heard at the DOJ. In the last several years,
federal prosecutors have begun saying more about the corporate
prosecution process and appear to be more willing than before—and
far more willing than in any other area of criminal enforcement—to
tie their own hands (albeit lightly) with policy pronouncements and
guidance, both in individual enforcement actions and in the more
general contexts of policy papers and speeches.11
Prosecutors, to repeat, do not have to do any of this as a matter
of law or tactics to win their cases. And when enforcement actors
enjoy power and discretion, they risk giving some of that up, even if
only at the margins, when they commit themselves to public reasoning
about their actions.
This Essay explores various reasons why prosecutors might
choose to speak about their cases, particularly in the area of
corporate criminal enforcement, and especially as the DOJ has been
increasingly doing so in that field over the last two decades.
Examining the phenomenon might produce a clearer understanding
of the general question of why prosecutors speak. Perhaps more
fruitfully, focusing this examination on the sub-field of corporate
10. Erik Luna, The Curious Case of Corporate Criminality, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1507, 1513–14 (2009); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, 1137–38 (2016) (calling for various forms of greater oversight
of and control on the exercise of federal agency enforcement discretion). A more nuanced
criticism from academic quarters is that the DOJ’s corporate enforcement process too
often involves counter-productive meddling in corporate governance. See Jennifer Arlen,
Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose
Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO
REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 62, 62 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow
eds., 2011); Jennifer Arlen & Marcel Kahan, Corporate Governance Regulation Through
Non-Prosecution, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 324–25 (2017); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate
Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2075, 2078–79 (2016). But
see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An
Integrated Approach to Investigations and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2014)
(“[T]hough substantial commentary urges prosecutors to avoid intruding into corporate
governance, this Essay explains the importance of prosecutors investing in it.”).
11. See infra Part I.
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crime might produce new insights into how to evaluate normatively
what the DOJ is doing in the way it presents its corporate
enforcement activities—i.e., whether its publicity efforts are helpful
and, if so, whether and how these efforts could be expanded or
improved.
After all, as with so much of the literature in this field, the
unlikelihood of legislative reform of the practice of American
corporate criminal liability leaves us necessarily addressing questions
of how to optimize enforcement under current practice—by directing
our efforts almost entirely to what prosecutors do.12 There may be
little to gain, in terms of law reform or novel insight, by publishing
more laments about that fact.
This Essay proceeds as follows. Part I explains how prosecutors
speak in the area of corporate crime and how that speech has
developed over the last two decades. Part II specifies and evaluates a
variety of explanations for what prosecutors have been saying. Part
III considers whether recent trends have been favorable and whether
we should welcome prosecutors continuing along current avenues or
if we should urge them to rethink how they talk about corporate
crime. The perhaps counterintuitive conclusion is that observers
should be skeptical of the value of prosecutors’ written policies, but
they should also encourage prosecutors to continue to engage in
detailed public disclosure when settling with individual corporations.
I. HOW PROSECUTORS TALK ABOUT CORPORATE CRIME
A. Birth of DPAs and NPAs
The modern corporate criminal settlement was famously born in
1994 when the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern
District of New York entered into an agreement with Prudential
Securities, Inc. (“Prudential”) to file a criminal complaint against
Prudential for securities fraud, defer that prosecution for three years,
and then dismiss the complaint if Prudential complied with the terms
of agreement.13 It is now well known that the Prudential deferred
prosecution agreement (“DPA”) was proposed by Prudential’s
defense counsel, who had the clever idea of avoiding indictment and

12. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 10, at 47–48; Griffith, supra note 10, at 2116–19,
2134.
13. See Letter Agreement from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., to
Scott W. Muller & Carey R. Dunne, Attorneys, Davis Polk & Wardell, on behalf of
Prudential Securities Inc. (Oct. 27, 1994) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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conviction by urging the prosecutors to deploy a procedural device
long used to divert prosecutions of low-level offenders, most often in
drug prosecutions.14 The U.S. Attorney’s Office was persuaded to
take this route in order to avoid a criminal conviction that could cause
Prudential to collapse.
The Prudential DPA consisted of a four-page letter that read like
a modified version of the standard cooperation agreement for
individual cases that the Southern District of New York was using in
the early 1990s.15 It required the usual forms of cooperation and
established the ordinary grounds for breach: provision of corporate
documents, assistance in gaining access to witnesses, and agreement
to be held in violation (and thus subject to prosecution) for failure to
comply with the terms of the deal or commission of any subsequent
crime.16 In addition, it required Prudential to pay a $330 million
penalty and install a new, government-approved outside director who
would act as an “ombudsman” to receive anonymous ethics and
compliance complaints.17
Thus, even at the inception of the modern corporate settlement,
the DOJ was involved in the business of corporate reform in
conjunction with criminal investigations. However, the Prudential
DPA contained no statement of facts or other details of Prudential’s
wrongdoing, much less any admission by Prudential to any matters of
fact or law.18 Nor did this agreement contain any explanation or
signals as to why the DOJ chose to exercise its discretion to defer
prosecution. The letter did include, as an attachment, a letter from
Prudential’s lawyers appealing to the government’s discretion and
suggesting the DPA. 19 That letter talked at some length about
Prudential’s efforts to reform itself in the area of compliance and
cooperate with various government investigations.20 The Prudential
DPA was filed with a magistrate judge in the Southern District of
New York, who signed an order deferring the prosecution for three

14. See Letter from Scott W. Muller & Carrey R. Dunne, Attorneys, Davis Polk &
Wardell, on behalf of Prudential Securities, Inc., to Kenneth J. Vianale, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, S. Dist. of N.Y., & Baruch Weiss, Senior Trial Counsel, S. Dist. of N.Y. (Oct. 13,
1994) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
15. See Letter Agreement from Mary Jo White, supra note 13.
16. See id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (letter attachment).
20. Id.
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years. 21 The U.S. Attorney, then Mary Jo White, issued a press
release22 and the New York Times and Wall Street Journal published
brief stories reporting the resolution.23 Three years later, another
magistrate judge signed a dismissal order.24
Another well-known first-generation settlement was the nonprosecution agreement (“NPA”)25 reached in 1996 between the DOJ
and the Arthur Andersen accounting firm in connection with an
investigation of Colonial Realty, a Connecticut company that
Andersen audited.26 This four-page letter agreement contained no
statement of facts, no legal allegations, no admission of wrongdoing—
indeed, it noted that Andersen denied any wrongdoing—and no
reform or oversight obligations. 27 The agreement was simply a
contract to trade a promise not to prosecute for a promise to
cooperate, plus $10 million. No explanation was given, or event
hinted at, with respect to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The
U.S. Attorney in Connecticut issued a brief press release.28

21. See Deferral of Prosecution, United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 1:94-mj02189-UA (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1994), ECF No. 3.
22. Government to Defer Prosecution Over PSI Limited Partnership Sales, 26 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1468, 1468 (Nov. 4, 1994).
23. U.S. to Reprimand Rather Than Indict, A Prudential Unit, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27,
1994, at A8; Kurt Eichenwald, U.S. Filing Expected on Prudential, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27,
1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/27/business/us-filing-expected-on-prudential.html
?pagewanted=print [https://perma.cc/N3ND-MLQQ (dark archive)]. Prudential’s lawyer
called the settlement “unusual” and, when asked whether more such agreements should
be expected in the future, flatly opined, “No.” Government to Defer Prosecution Over PSI
Limited Partnership Sales, supra note 22, at 1469. Prognostication is difficult.
24. See Order for Dismissal, United States v. Prudential Sec., Inc., No. 1:94-mj-02189UA (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 1997), ECF No. 4.
25. A NPA and a DPA differ principally in one way: a DPA provides for the
government to file charges but not pursue them, and in a NPA, the government agrees to
refrain from filing charges. See Robert J. Sussman & Gregory S. Saikin, Corporate Crimes:
The Penalties and the Pendulum, 43 ADVOCATE (TEX), Summer 2008, at 39, 45 n.36.
26. See Letter from Edwin J. Gale, Acting U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Conn., Peter A.
Clark, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Dist. of Conn., & Thomas J. Murphy, Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Dist. of Conn. to Eliot Lauer, Attorney, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle,
on behalf of Arthur Andersen LLP, & Shaun S. Sullivan, Attorney, Wiggin & Dana, on
behalf of Arthur Andersen LLP (Apr. 15, 1996) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
27. Id. (“It is understood that neither this agreement nor any action taken by
Andersen under this agreement is an acknowledgement or admission in any way by
Andersen that it has acted improperly or has violated any law, rule, regulation,
professional standard, or other standard of practice.”).
28. See Steve Burkholder, Arthur Andersen Paying $10.3 Million to End Probe into
Real Estate Deals, 28 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 568, 569 (Apr. 26, 1996); see also Arthur
Andersen to Pay $10 Million to Settle Colonial Realty Case, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 1996, at
C26; George Judson, Accountants to Pay $10 Million to Victims of Real Estate Fraud, N.Y.
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Andersen’s involvement in this story is perhaps ironic given that
the firm’s supposed death-by-trial in 2002, in connection with the
collapse of Enron,29 followed its refusal to accept a DPA that would
have required an admission of wrongdoing in that affair.30 In the
intervening years, the DOJ’s views of what a corporate criminal
resolution ought to accomplish had, as will be discussed, evolved
substantially.
B.

Current DPA and NPA Practice

By way of contrast, move forward to current practice. Criminal
lawyers have long talked about the “speaking indictment,” that is, a
charging document that sets forth in factual detail the government’s
case. 31 Prosecutors are not required to plead their cases with
granularity. The law on the subject requires only that the charging
instrument provide sufficient notice for the defendant to be able to
meet the accusations—what offense, committed roughly where, when,
by whom, and not much more.32 Prosecutors, however, are free within
reason to draft liberally, as long as they do not gratuitously use the
charging instrument to prejudice the defendant or uncharged
persons.33 It seems that in the field of corporate crime, we should now
add to the idea of the “speaking indictment” the concept of the
“speaking settlement.”
Between the early 1990s and the present, the corporate criminal
settlement has exploded in prevalence. One recent study reports a

TIMES (Apr. 24, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/24/nyregion/accountants-to-pay10-million-to-victims-of-real-estate-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/62W9-KU53 (dark archive)].
29. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917, 917
(2004); Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 479–87 (2006).
30. See Brickey, supra note 29, at 926; Buell, supra note 29, at 489 n.86.
31. Anthony S. Barkow & Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 GA. L.
REV. 953, 1003–04 (2010).
32. See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (noting that “an
indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly
informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him
to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense”);
United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 474 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that an indictment is
“not impaired” when it charges more than is necessary for a conviction). But see United
States v. Olson, 262 F.3d 795, 798–99 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding the indictment insufficient
because it failed to include an essential element of the crime charged).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 384 F. Supp. 2d 958, 961 (W.D. Va. 2005)
(striking surplusage from an indictment regarding the defendant’s prior issues with
environmental agencies due to prejudice); United States v. Gotti, 42 F. Supp. 2d 252, 292–
93 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (striking “conspired to murder” language from a RICO indictment due
to the risk of unfair prejudice).
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total of nearly 500 criminal resolutions of all types between the DOJ
and public corporations between 1997 and 2011, with a rise in annual
corporate settlements from ten in 1997 to a high of almost eighty in
2010.34 There is not space here to conduct an empirical measurement
of the verbosity of settlement documents over time—this Essay is in
part a call for how to make such measurement more accessible. But it
is clear to all in the field that the trend has been away from barebones
and towards detail, in both disclosure of background facts and in
contract terms.
For example, in September 2016, Och-Ziff Capital Management
(“Och-Ziff”), a hedge fund, entered into a DPA, while one of its
subsidiaries pled guilty, in connection with violations of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). 35 The Och-Ziff settlement
agreements are thick enough for a good-sized binder clip. 36 The
company fully admitted wrongdoing, including conceding all of the
allegations in a thirty-two-page statement of facts that told the story,
down to the level of damning emails, of the firm’s bribery activities in
the resource sector of several African nations.37 The financial penalty
of $213 million was justified with a detailed analysis of how the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines would have treated the case.38 The company
was made to promise that it would make no public statements that
contradicted any aspect of the agreement. 39 Och-Ziff agreed to
extensive compliance reforms (detailed in a seven-page appendix)40
and the hiring of a compliance monitor (whose powers and
obligations were set forth in an even longer appendix).41
The Och-Ziff agreement even includes a section in which the
DOJ sets forth in writing “relevant considerations” that led to the
decision to enter into the agreement.42 The ensuing list includes the
34. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal
Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea
Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 540 (2015) (studying plea agreements as well as
non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements).
35. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Och-Ziff Capital Management Admits to
Role in Africa Bribery Conspiracies and Agrees to Pay $213 Million Criminal Fine (Sept.
29, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/och-ziff-capital-management-admits-roleafrica-bribery-conspiracies-and-agrees-pay-213 [https://perma.cc/4UG5-9C9Q].
36. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt.
Grp. LLC, No. 16-516 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016); Plea Agreement, United States
v. Oz Africa Mgmt. GP, LLC, No. 16-515 (NGG) (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2016).
37. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 36, at A-1-32.
38. Id. at 7–8.
39. Id. at 17–18.
40. Id. at C-1 to -7.
41. Id. at D-1 to -10.
42. Id. at 3–5.
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amount of discount off of the bottom end of the Sentencing
Guidelines range that the DOJ granted Och-Ziff as a credit for the
firm’s decision to self-report, the extent of the company’s efforts to
assist in the FCPA investigation and to remedy its compliance
program and internal controls, the agreement to tolerate a monitor,
the widespread extent of the wrongdoing in “high-risk jurisdictions,”
and the company’s lack of criminal history.43
C.

The DOJ’s Policies and Guidelines

Agreements to settle cases are not the only place where
prosecutors have been talking about corporate criminal settlements.
As the practice has matured and become more routine, the DOJ has
issued a series of policy documents and speeches that have
progressively said more about what the government is doing, when it
does or does not prosecute corporations, and why.
The saga of the DOJ corporate prosecution guidelines—the
journey through the “memos” (that is, guidelines revisions) of Deputy
Attorneys General Holder, Thompson, McNulty, Filip, and Yates—
has been told often enough in ample detail.44 To condense, the DOJ
has created and published something for prosecuting corporations,
which is unique in its manuals and practices, governing the charging
decisions of its personnel: a lengthy roadmap through a multi-factor
analysis that the prosecutor must conduct in order to decide on the
correct resolution of a corporate criminal case, whether it be
charging, settling, or declining to prosecute.45
The DOJ has done this, at this level, for no other kind of
defendant or offense. Of course, the guidelines are not enforceable.

43. Id.
44. See generally, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW
PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014) (examining “the terms of the
deals that prosecutors now negotiate with companies, how prosecutors fine companies to
punish them, the changes companies must make to prevent future crimes, and whether
prosecutors pursue individual employees”); Lawrence D. Finder & Ryan D. McConnell,
Devolution of Authority: The Department of Justice’s Corporate Charging Policies, 51 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2006) (“Although the rise in the number of agreements may not be
directly linked to the fall of Enron and Andersen and the rise of the Thompson Memo, the
temptation to link the three events is overwhelming.”); Court E. Golumbic & Albert D.
Lichy, The “Too Big to Jail” Effect and the Impact on the Justice Department’s Corporate
Charging Policy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1293 (2014) (examining the impact of recent
developments in the corporate criminal context on the Justice Department’s historical
reliance on deferred prosecutions).
45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.000 (2017),
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-businessorganizations [https://perma.cc/MEN4-7ZKD].
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The law of charging corporations remains the same as it is throughout
federal and state criminal practice: nearly unreviewable discretion in
the absence of invidious discrimination.46 Yet the leadership at the
DOJ in Washington has spent much energy over the last two decades
pouring over and refining these corporate prosecution guidelines,
with the periodic splashy release of revisions via press conferences
and speeches.47 Each iteration of the guidelines has, for the most part,
expanded them and made them more detailed, as the DOJ adapts to
how prosecutors learn what works in corporate enforcement. Or what
is not successful, as in the Filip Memo’s retreat on waivers of attorney
client privilege 48 or the Yates Memo’s flag-planting about reemphasizing individual prosecutions in corporate enforcement.49
The corporate prosecution guidelines have become a lingua
franca, or common space, in which prosecutors, the defense bar,
lobbying groups, the press, and academic critics who write about
corporate enforcement skirmish over policy and practice. They are
not law. But in some ways they are strangely law-like. Since
negotiation, not litigation, is the primary means by which corporate
criminal cases are resolved, the guidelines become the “rules” in the

46. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996); Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757–58 (1970); see
also In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(noting that the guidelines are “not required by any constitutional or statutory provision”
and “exist to guide the Department’s exercise of its discretion”).
47. See, e.g., Lanny Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address
at the New York City Bar Association (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech
/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-new-york-city-bar-association [https://perma.cc
/QR43-WWWR]; Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Address at American Conference Institute’s 31st International Conference on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistantattorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-speaks-american-conference-institute-s-31st [https://perma.cc
/ZXL4-8KDY]; Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks at New York University Law School’s Program on Corporate Compliance and
Enforcement (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorneygeneral-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarks-new-york-university-law [https://perma.cc
/MN43-2FMP]; Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Remarks at New York University School of Law Announcing New Policy on Individual
Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.justice.gov
/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-sally-quillian-yates-delivers-remarks-new-yorkuniversity-school [https://perma.cc/YF8F-P4W4].
48. Jonathan D. Glater & Michael M. Grynbaum, U.S. Lifts a Policy in Corporate
Crime Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/business
/29kpmg.html [https://perma.cc/BQS4-MK3N (dark archive)].
49. Matt Apuzzo & Ben Protess, Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street
Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/us/politics
/new-justice-dept-rules-aimed-at-prosecuting-corporate-executives.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc
/J84X-2H36 (dark archive)].
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shadow of which the government and corporations settle. And their
authority has accreted over time through repeated use in practice, to
the point that even some critics who continue to call for more
meaningful doctrines of corporate criminal liability in American law
propose a kind of black-letter adoption of the government’s
prosecution guidelines.50
From these developments of the last two decades, the DOJ and
its sister agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
seem to be taking the lesson that even more guideline adoption would
be better. In November 2012, the DOJ and SEC jointly released “A
Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” a 100page document that both explains the government’s views on the
particulars of the statutory scheme and contains several chapters on
principles guiding enforcement discretion, how the government
determines penalties, and what sorts of settlements may be available
in various contexts.51
In a related vein, the Fraud Section at the DOJ issued two
related documents in 2016: a nine-page memo announcing a one-year
FCPA “pilot program” that explains what companies can do in
responding to wrongdoing in order to receive up to a fifty percent
reduction in penalty from the bottom of the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range,52 and an eight-page memo that provides additional
detail on how companies ought to structure and evaluate their
compliance programs in order to obtain maximum credit from the

50. W. Robert Thomas, How and Why Corporations Became (and Remain) Persons
Under the Criminal Law, 44 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 47).
51. See CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENF’T DIV., U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE
COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2015/01/16/guide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8ZS4-9R2N].
52. FRAUD SECTION, CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FRAUD SECTION’S
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMENT PLAN AND GUIDANCE (2016). For
two examples of commentary on the pilot program, see generally Baker & McKenzie
Partner Robert Kent on the New World of FCPA Compliance, CORP. CRIME RPTR., Dec.
12, 2016, at 1, 3–4 (discussing the pilot program in relation to the Harris investigation) and
Bruce E. Yannett, Andrew M. Levine & Philip Rohlik, The Difficulty of Defining a
Declination: An Update on DOJ’s Pilot Program, NYU COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Nov. 16, 2016), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance_enforcement/2016
/11/16/the-difficulty-of-defining-a-declination-an-update-on-the-dojs-pilot-program/
[https://perma.cc/MGL4-Y4FU] (discussing the pilot program’s guidance on how to
receive a declination). For two recent enforcement examples, see General Cable Gets Non
Prosecution Agreement to Pay $75 Million to Settle FCPA Charge, CORP. CRIME RPTR.,
Jan. 9, 2017, at 7–8 and Rolls Royce to Pay $810 Million to Get Prosecutions Deferred in
Bribery Case, CORP. CRIME RPTR., Jan. 23, 2017, at 6–7.
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DOJ in the exercise of enforcement discretion.53Also, back in 2008,
the DOJ published detailed guidance in a document called the
Morford Memo on how corporate monitors used in criminal
settlements should be selected, and how the scope of their duties and
evaluation of their performance should be determined.54 Corporate
enforcement authorities in the United Kingdom, the jurisdiction that
most commonly works in coordination with the United States, seem
to believe they too should be making their processes more
transparent.55
Through the DOJ’s policies and practices, a common law of
corporate criminal enforcement has emerged in the twenty-plus years
since the Prudential settlement. It is contained primarily in the record
of disclosed, detailed settlements that tell a story about who got what
for doing what, and secondarily in an unusually verbose set of policy
pronouncements, about what the DOJ is doing in the field of

53. FRAUD SECTION, CRIM. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EVALUATION OF
CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS (2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/
page/file/937501/download [https://perma.cc/6C87-KR8Q]; see also Jonathan J. Rusch,
Memorandum to the Compliance Counsel, United States Department of Justice, 6 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 69, 86 (2016) (“For foreign bribery and corruption matters, the
FCPA Resource Guide has been a substantial step in that direction, but has proved to be
too brief in presenting its much-touted hallmarks of compliance.”). The Fraud Section had
made a small splash earlier by announcing that it had hired a private-sector lawyer to work
as “compliance counsel” who helps advise both the DOJ and corporations about how to
assess the quality of compliance efforts. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, New
Compliance Counsel Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud Section (Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download
[https://perma.cc/L2TYT759]; see also Ryan Rohlfsen & Nicholas F. Rodriguez, DOJ Announces New
Compliance Counsel and Outlines Metrics for Evaluating Corporate Compliance Programs
Under Scrutiny, ROPES & GRAY (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom
/alerts/2015/November/DOJ-Announces-New-Compliance-Counsel-and-OutlinesMetrics.aspx [https://perma.cc/B3GJ-AGAN].
54. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of
Dep’t Components, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (March 7, 2008). For criticism on the lack of
guidance and coverage of the memorandum, see Ashcroft Defends Role as Federal
Monitor; DOJ Releases Guidance on Selection Process, 82 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 636 (Mar.
19, 2008),. For critical analysis of the use of monitors in corporate criminal settlements, see
Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Compliance?,
34 J. CORP. L. 679, 681 (2009); Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The
Corporate Monitor: The New Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1714–15 (2007).
55. See Karolos Seeger & Andrew Lee, UK’s Financial Conduct Authority and
Prudential Regulation Authority Announce Changes to Enforcement Process, NYU
COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Feb. 2, 2017), https://wp.nyu.edu/compliance
_enforcement/2017/02/02/uks-financial-conduct-authority-and-prudential-regulation-authority
-announce-changes-to-enforcement-processes/ [https://perma.cc/58ST-8UT4].
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corporate crime and why. There is every reason to expect this process
of articulation to continue and ramify.56
None of this is law, although many outside the government wish
it were.57 There is no requirement of consistency, or proportionality,
or even rationality in the resolutions that the DOJ reaches with
individual corporations, and many outside the government think all of
those things ought to be required.58 Occasionally the DOJ chooses to
hold its cards quite close in a corporate settlement, and some critics
think that sort of guardedness disserves the public interest.59
But, seen from another angle, the DOJ’s approach to corporate
enforcement stands apart from the brevity with which prosecutors at
the state and federal levels speak in nearly every other area of
criminal enforcement. In evaluating the prosecution of corporate
criminality and thinking about how to reform the practice, it might be
fruitful to consider prosecutorial behavior in this field from that
perspective. At the risk of belaboring the point, the law requires none
of what the DOJ has been doing. Therefore, when it comes to
corporate crime, why do prosecutors say anything?
II. WHY PROSECUTORS TALK THE WAY THEY DO
Public disclosure by prosecutors can run the gamut from nothing
more than terse, required court filings—sparsely pleaded indictments
and bland motion papers—to the extensive, factually detailed
settlement papers and policy pronouncements that typify the DOJ’s
approach to corporate crime. To understand what the DOJ has been
doing in the corporate crime field, it will help to canvass broadly the
political, economic, strategic, and professional motivations that might
56. This is subject to the caveat that no one can currently predict whether the Trump
administration will have interest in continuing the more or less straight-line development
of corporate crime policy that has characterized the last three presidencies.
57. See Jennifer Arlen, Prosecuting Beyond the Rule of Law: Corporate Mandates
Imposed Through Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 191, 192–93,
214–17, 226 (2016) (discussing unchecked discretion that runs contrary to the rule of law
and suggesting more consistency and enforcement, perhaps through enhanced guidelines
and judicial oversight); see also Brandon L. Garrett, The Metamorphosis of Corporate
Criminal Prosecutions, 101 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 60, 61–62, 72 (2016) (discussing
ineffectual changes to the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual and the need for more robust
enforcement mechanisms for DOJ prosecutors).
58. See Arlen, supra note 57, at 231.
59. See Brief for Professor Brandon L. Garrett as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellee at 19–23, United States v. HSBC Bank USA, 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017) (Nos.
16-308(L), 16-353, 16-1068, 16-1094) (noting that secrecy leads to recidivism and harms
good compliance); see also GARRETT, supra note 44, at 254 (noting that the public never
knows if decisions are sound or even which corporate crimes prosecutors investigate in the
first place).
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cause prosecutors to disclose information about their cases and talk
about what they are doing.60 In the field of corporate crime, some
motivations are more explanatory than others. This Essay moves
through the following explanations, proceeding roughly from less
attractive to more appealing: to cause prejudice, for career
advancement, to obtain public support and promote legitimacy, to
please Congress, to satisfy industry and the defense bar, to generate
evidence, and to further the purposes of punishment.
A. To Prejudice the Jury Pool
Let’s start with perhaps the most self-interested and unattractive
motivation for prosecutors to talk about their cases. It has long been a
complaint of defense lawyers that, in high-profile cases, prosecutors
hold press conferences to announce criminal charges and include lurid
facts in their indictments so the press will disseminate the gory details
to the public.61 The effect is to cement the idea of guilt in the minds of
the community at large, making it far more likely that persons called
for jury service in any such case will, consciously or not, harbor fixed
prejudices against the defendant.62 Starting with arrest, charging, and
a press conference, the presumption of innocence is replaced by a
presumption of guilt. While the law on the subject is unfavorable for
defendants, sometimes such disclosures can give rise to a
constitutional claim for moving the location of trial or, ex post, for a
new trial.63
Disclosure for the purpose of prejudicing the jury pool is, of
course, improper. But it also cannot be policed as long as the
prosecutor’s disclosures consist of facts that are spelled out in the
charging instrument that the prosecutor is required by law to file (that
is, is based on the evidence), and the prosecutor is careful to liberally
insert the word “allegation.” Of course, even the cynical prosecutor
might refrain from this kind of disclosure in a high-profile case,
calculating that any benefits in solidifying public attitudes are
60. Disclosures made in the discovery process are not treated as of interest here since
the question is why prosecutors share information with the public (including, of course,
subjects of prosecution), and discovery material is typically shared only with charged
persons and entities. In any event, “discovery” usually runs the other way in corporate
crime: during the investigative phase (after which almost all cases settle), the documents
and witness testimony run almost entirely from the corporation to the government.
61. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 354 (1966); United States v. Coast of
Me. Lobster Co., 538 F.2d 899, 902 (1st Cir. 1976).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825, 836 (2d Cir. 1995).
63. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 377–79 (2010); see also Cutler, 58
F.3d at 838.
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outweighed by the strategic advantages lost in tipping one’s hand
about the proof.
This perhaps common narrative in the criminal justice system
does not fit federal prosecution of corporate crime. Given the DOJ’s
hard-earned reputation for independence and professionalism, one
would like to think that DOJ lawyers are more responsible and
careful than the prosecutor who is tempted to inflame public
sentiment. But predispositions do not matter much because corporate
cases simply are not pursued with an eye toward trial. In the
overwhelming majority of cases, the prosecutor does not hold a press
conference and release case documents until the defendant has
already agreed to settle and thus waive any trial rights.64 Potential
jurors are not a relevant audience.
B.

For Career Advancement

Drawing a lot of attention in the area of corporate crime could
be a way for prosecutors to get to future jobs they may want, whether
those jobs are in higher office or in the private legal sector—or so
they might think. A sometimes accurate stereotype of prosecutors is
that they are hungry press hounds who choose their cases and roll
them out to achieve the maximum possible public exposure for
themselves: the murder indictment press conference, surrounded by
the victim’s family; the big drug gang take-down, with the tables
festooned with kilos of powder and menacing firearms; and, yes, the
press conference carried live on CNBC to announce the massive fine
and the admission of wrongdoing secured in the latest criminal
settlement with a Fortune 500 company.
This story is at least a bit more nuanced in the case of corporate
crime. Most federal prosecutors, even most U.S. Attorneys, are not
aiming for elected office—and they did not need votes to get their
jobs in the first place. If these prosecutors have an eye on a future job,
it is almost always one of three positions: a more senior appointment
with the DOJ, a partnership at a marquee law firm, or a general
counsel-type position at a major corporation or investment firm. Press

64. See Gabriel Markoff, Arthur Andersen and the Myth of the Corporate Death
Penalty: Corporate Criminal Convictions in the Twenty-First Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
797, 811 (2013) (noting that more than ninety percent of corporate convictions end in plea
agreements and that in the year 2010, 139 out of 145 corporate convictions resulted in plea
agreements); see also Alexander & Cohen, supra note 34, at 563; Brandon L. Garrett,
Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1801–02 n.102 (2011) (pointing
to U.S. Sentencing Commission data from 2000–2008 showing that 176 corporate
convictions out of 1,924 (or 9%) occurred at trial).
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does not hurt, to be sure; name recognition always helps in these job
markets. But the more direct leverage comes from having built a
resume that includes “big” prosecutions, whether measured by
complexity, size of settlement, importance of defendant, or
seriousness and extent of wrongdoing.
The resume-building motivation might tilt in favor of playing up
the features of a corporate prosecution through public disclosure of
facts and settlement documents. At least equally, it tilts in favor of
going to trial, a course that the prosecutor largely controls but that
has been rare in corporate prosecutions, as some observers have
lamented. 65 The DOJ’s issuance of policy guidance, meanwhile,
probably does little for individual resumes, unless one thinks that the
likes of Larry Thompson and Eric Holder needed a memo named
after them to get where they have gotten.
Some have worried that career motivations may have caused
prosecutors to become increasingly attracted to the corporate
criminal settlement over the last decade or so, at the expense of
individual prosecutions.66 On this account, prosecutors prefer easy
cases, especially ones that come with newspaper articles and big
checks, to hard cases that require long, drawn-out investigations and
risky, onerous trials.67 The result is that prosecutors grab the lowhanging fruit of settling charges with the cooperation of compliant
corporate defendants, then leave the higher, but perhaps better, fruit
of individual cases unpicked, as they lose interest and move on to the
tree or orchard of the next alarming industry scandal.
The Yates Memo would seem to indicate either that the recent
DOJ leadership shared some of this worry or that prosecutors do not
like to be criticized for lacking zeal.68 Still, one wonders why the
ambitiously careerist prosecutor would not seek out trials over
settlements, especially high-profile trials involving senior corporate
executives. In any event, it is unlikely that a preference for corporate
over individual prosecutions, or vice versa, would change anything
65. For one full lament, see generally JESSE EISINGER, THE CHICKENSHIT CLUB:
WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES (2017) (discussing
how the modern DOJ has lost the will and ability to go to trial in corporate prosecutions).
66. Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789,
1790 (2015); Jed. S. Rakoff, The Financial Crisis: Why Have No High-Level Executives
Been Prosecuted?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, at 4, 6.
67. See EISINGER, supra note 65, at xiv–xv.
68. Aruna Viswanatha, Rules to Spur Executive Charges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2015,
at A4; Peter J. Henning, The Prospects for Pursuing Corporate Executives, N.Y. TIMES,
(Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/15/business/dealbook/theprospects-forpursuing-corporate-executives.html [https://perma.cc/4ZB5-56C8 (dark archive)].
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about the prosecutorial taste for attracting public attention. In the
end, the DOJ’s compunction to talk a great deal more about what it
does in the field of corporate crime than in other areas is not
convincingly attributable to the career ambitions of its prosecutors.
C.

For Public Support and Legitimacy

Even when they are appointed (as in the federal system) rather
than elected, prosecutors seem to share an abiding and reasonable
belief that because their “client” is the public, the client has a right to
know what the prosecutor is doing and should, in some general sense,
approve of and support the prosecutor’s work. Of course, this only
goes so far. Few prosecutors take suggestions from the public about
whom to indict or even what kinds of crime to concentrate on.
Prosecutors act with a fiduciary-like concept of their relationship to
the communities in which they work—“your officials know your best
interests”—while wanting communities to know that they are
devoting themselves to that task. The primary vehicles for
communicating this message are the press conference, press release,
newspaper interview, website, community meeting, and the like. In
U.S. Attorneys’ offices, these activities comprise a major part of the
head prosecutor’s job.
When the interests of the case collide with the interest in
informing the public, however, the case wins. Prosecutors have no
compunctions about terse filings, motions to seal pleadings and
courtrooms, protective orders, the use of clandestine investigative
measures, and so on—when such secrecy serves the purpose of
obtaining convictions. Recall the shopworn quote, “We do not
comment on ongoing investigations,” which at least limits such
comments to anonymously sourced leaks.
This legitimation motive is germane to the DOJ’s corporate
crime program. Perhaps no area of criminal enforcement, aside from
anti-terrorism efforts, has so preoccupied the American public’s mind
over the last two decades. 69 “What are they doing about those
corporate criminals?” has been a persistent question since even

69. See generally SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE (2016) (discussing issues of American
public life raised by the subject of corporate crime, how American law defines white collar
crime, the machinery of criminal enforcement in the business world, and political and
societal complications raised by these issues); see also Garrett, supra note 64, at 1776 (“In
the past, domestic prosecutions of foreign corporations were not particularly
noteworthy. . . . All of this has changed. Federal prosecutors now advertise how they target
foreign corporations.”).
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before the 2001 collapse of the Enron Corporation and has been an
even more common one since the 2008 financial crisis.70 It is obvious
why federal prosecutors, whose jurisdiction has traditionally been
thought to be primary, if not dominant, over corporate crime, would
feel defensive about these questions.
The first way to address such public concerns is to prosecute
corporate cases. But it is natural that, as the government does this, it
would want to engage in colorful public displays about what it is
doing—assembling “task forces,” issuing policy papers, holding press
conferences to explain how each filed or settled action fits into the
larger “campaign” against corporate crime, etc.
There is another specific reason for officials to call as much
attention as possible to the cases that the government does bring in
this area. Prosecutors understand, though the public often does not,
that not everything corporations do that makes the public angry is an
appropriate or legally eligible candidate for criminal prosecution. It is
a fact of the current relationship between the corporate sector and the
regulatory state—about which I have written at some length71—that
criminal prosecution has come to occupy an ill-fitting role as a
backstop in dealing with the problem of how to manage and regulate
the activities of the large, modern firm. Federal prosecutors have
been partially responsible for this in their zeal to step into various
regulatory breaches with the tools of federal criminal law.72 But they
likely also experience anxiety about the limits of those tools in dealing
with problems that are much larger in their implications than the

70. See, e.g., Investigating and Prosecuting Financial Fraud After the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 1–4 (2010) (statement of Sen. Edward Kaufman); JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE
PAYOFF: WHY WALL STREET ALWAYS WINS 65–95 (2012); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
INST., JUSTICE INACTION: THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S UNPRECEDENTED FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE BIG FINANCE 5–7 (2012), http://g-a-i.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08
/DOJ-Report-8-61.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF7N-MFP9]; Editorial, Going Soft on Corporate
Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at A26; Joe Nocera, Biggest Fish Face Little Risk of
Being Caught, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2011, at B1, B7; Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS
television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables
[https://perma.cc/XVA2-R7G3]; Matt Taibbi, Why Isn’t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING
STONE (Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail20110216 [https://perma.cc/FP4H-FTQ9]; 60 Minutes: Prosecuting Wall Street (CBS
television broadcast Dec. 4, 2011), https://www.cbsnews.com/videos/prosecuting-wallstreet-pt-1 [https://perma.cc/4A39-H9EW].
71. See generally BUELL, supra note 69 (discussing the history and legal framework of
prosecuting corporations involved in white collar crime).
72. See Rachel E. Barkow, The Prosecutor as Regulatory Agency, in PROSECUTORS IN
THE BOARDROOM, supra note 10, at 177; Miriam H. Baer, Choosing Punishment, 92 B.U.
L. REV. 577, 581–82 (2012).
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relatively narrow legal category of crime—limits that the public often
does not understand and might not care about if it did.
Thus, when the DOJ, at the press conference accompanying a
corporate settlement, drops a thick pile of paper and announces the
collection of a large financial penalty, it is trying hard to say, “Here is
what we are doing about corporate crime.” The hope, although
perhaps fanciful, is that the public will eventually come to the
conclusion that the government is indeed “tough” on corporate
crime—with the result that prosecutors will be able to sleep better at
night believing they have done the public’s work.
D. To Please and Mollify Congress
Federal prosecutors have a more intimate relationship with their
legislature than most state prosecutors. Congress, particularly the
judiciary committees and certain members of those committees, is
regularly on the DOJ’s back about both prosecutions and policy. The
DOJ has a tendency to jump when Congress calls because of the
legislature’s control over budgets and criminal statutes, with both
mechanisms operating as either a carrot or a stick.73 Congress can
increase or decrease the DOJ’s resources for investigating and
prosecuting corporate crime, particularly on the critical dimension of
staffing. Congress can also expand the law governing business
crime—as it did, for example, with the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation74—
or it can erect hurdles to such prosecutions—as it threatened to do,
for example, with regard to the DOJ’s treatment of waivers of the
corporate attorney-client privilege.75

73. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 793–802 (1998); Daniel Richman, Political
Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 58 DUKE L.J. 2087,
2092–93 (2009) [hereinafter Richman, Political Control].
74. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 903–06, 116 Stat. 745,
805–06 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 18 and 29 U.S.C. (2012)); see also
Kathryn Keneally, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer, 4 J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 15, 17–18
(2003).
75. See generally Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV.
897 (2006) (discussing corporate attorney-client privilege waivers and proposing the
establishment of a uniform corporate attorney-client privilege modeled after the control
group test); Julie R. O’Sullivan, Does DOJ’s Privilege Waiver Policy Threaten the
Rationales Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine? A
Preliminary “No”, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1237 (2008) (discussing legislation related to
corporate attorney-client privilege waivers and arguing that corporate attorney-client
privilege waivers do not threaten the underlying rationales for attorney-client privilege
and the work product doctrine).
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This congressional pressure can cause prosecutors to move in
two directions that are potentially in tension. On the one hand,
because members of Congress are even more sensitive than
prosecutors to public unhappiness about corporate crime, the DOJ
will want Congress to believe that the DOJ is serious about the
prosecution of corporate crime. On the other hand, because members
of Congress are sensitive to the pleas of corporate lobbyists about
claimed government overreaching, the DOJ will want Congress to
believe that the DOJ is reasonable and measured in its approach to
investigating and prosecuting corporate crime. The latter motivation
produces a common dynamic in federal criminal law: the DOJ tends
to hold back, at least with some regularity, from pressing the outer
limits of its statutory powers, lest it provoke Congress into curtailing
those powers by legislation.76
Thus, when the DOJ makes a noisy announcement about a highprofile corporate enforcement action, it is in part gesturing down
Pennsylvania Avenue in the direction of Congress to show that its
prosecutors have been busy. The case then gets added to the running
list of corporate prosecutions that the DOJ will roll out for
congressional committees when members of Congress come
demanding to know what the Department has been doing.77 It should
be noted, of course, that this dynamic has far more influence on
officials at Main Justice in Washington, who work in the shadow of
Capitol Hill and know that the unpleasant task of congressional
testimony can be demanded of them at any moment. U.S. Attorneys
need concern themselves less with the direct meddling of Congress,78
though they face constant pressure from Main Justice to produce the
data that the DOJ’s leadership uses to justify its budgets and to keep
Congress at bay.79
At the same time, the DOJ is sometimes quick to modify its
practices when it sees a restless Congress preparing to interfere with
prosecutorial powers. There is no evidence, of which I am aware, that
the original corporate prosecution guidelines (the Holder Memo)
were issued in response to any congressional complaints. The likely
strongest motivation was to standardize prosecutorial practices in the

76. See Richman, Political Control, supra note 73, at 2111, 2114.
77. See, e.g., Investigating and Prosecuting Financial Fraud After the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 4, 6–7 (2010) (statements of Senator Edward E. Kaufman and Lanny A. Breuer,
Assistant Att’y Gen., United States Department of Justice).
78. See Richman, Political Control, supra note 73, at 2093–94.
79. See id. at 2097.
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growing field of corporate criminal enforcement that had produced
concerning inconsistency and unpredictability.80
But in the absence of the DOJ’s continual and deep attention,
from the top of the Department, to how its prosecutors exercise
charging discretion in this one area, it would have been far easier for
the DOJ’s critics to make the case that the federal doctrine of
corporate criminal liability ought to be narrowed by statute. The use
of written charging guidelines and centralization of authority at Main
Justice has been one way that the DOJ has kept Congress’s hands off
of some of federal prosecutors’ favorite tools, including the RICO
and money laundering statutes and the FCPA.81
In two notable instances in the area of corporate crime, the DOJ
has staved off legislation by issuing written guidance changing policy.
When Congress—largely in response to overbearing prosecutorial
behavior in the KPMG tax shelter affair82 and the reaction of federal
courts in New York to that behavior83—became interested in passing
legislation restricting prosecutors’ abilities to obtain waivers of
attorney-client privilege, the DOJ changed its policy to prohibit most
waiver requests. 84 Congress duly lost interest in the legislation.
Similarly, when Congress—largely in response to two kerfuffles
involving then U.S. Attorney Chris Christie and former Attorney
80. See Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1053 n.104
(2008).
81. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-47.000 (2016)
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-47000-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1977 [https://perma.cc
/QD4D-QHMW]; Id. § 9-105.000, https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-105000-moneylaundering [https://perma.cc/74ZR-EVR8]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’
MANUAL § 9-110.000 (2012) https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-110000-organizedcrime-and-racketeering [https://perma.cc/GTU5-JWH4].
82. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 33, 335–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) aff’d, 541 F.3d
130 (2d Cir. 2008). For the full background on this fascinating saga, see generally
EISINGER, supra note 65, at 125–46; TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR.,
CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY
(2014) (discussing government efforts to combat tax shelters).
83. See Stein, 541 F.3d at 157–58; Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 365, 367.
84. New DOJ Guidance on Attorney-Client Privilege Waivers Sparks Lots of
Discussion at Compliance and Ethics Event, PREVENTION OF CORP. LIABILITY: CURRENT
REPS.
(BNA)
(Oct.
20,
2008),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document
/XAD0VCOO000000 [https://perma.cc/U7CC-8Z7P (staff-uploaded archive)]; Gregory J.
Wallance & Jens D. Ohlin, DOJ Announces Revisions to McNulty Memo But Leaves Open
Questions About Privilege Waivers, 3 White Collar Crime Rep. (BNA) (No. 22) (Oct. 24,
2008),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/document/XETSM3G5GVG0
[https://perma.cc/N63V-H2ML (staff-uploaded archive)]. Congress at one time even
threatened to legislate generally on the process of deferred and non-prosecution
agreements, though the effort did not progress very far. See Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman,
Regulating the “New Regulators”: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 162 (2008).
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General John Ashcroft85—began to pursue legislation governing the
appointment of monitors in corporate criminal settlements, the DOJ
issued guidelines to control the selection and supervision of
monitors.86 Congress again lost interest in legislating.
Corporate crime is politically high profile, affects powerful actors
in the economy, and is subject to exceptionally broad prosecutorial
powers. Naturally, Congress would tend to be interested in meddling
in this area of criminal enforcement more than in some others, and
the DOJ would be particularly keen to protect its potent position in
the field. A logical question is why the DOJ’s public performances
around corporate prosecutions would have any effect on Congress.
Likely the standard political economy explanation holds here,
with a bit of emphasis: Congress generally prefers not to restrict
prosecutorial powers through legislation, and indeed often expands
those powers, so it can benefit from the perception that it has zero
tolerance for crime; Congress counts on federal prosecutors to
exercise their powers judiciously, lest the breathtaking scope of those
powers embarrass the entire government; and prosecutors oblige in
order to preserve their unfettered power.87 In corporate crime, this
dynamic is only more likely to operate because of the desire among
most members of Congress to walk a fine line between being antibusiness crime but pro-legitimate business activities.
E.

To Satisfy Industry and the Defense Bar

Federal prosecutors have a reason to talk about what they are
doing in the area of corporate crime that has no analogue in the
enforcement of “regular” criminal law. Prosecutors, it turns out, are
susceptible to a kind of lobbying. This pressure, which influences their
tendency to make written policies and disclose them, is related to the
pressure that industry can indirectly place on prosecutors through its
influence on Congress. But it goes beyond that. It comes from the
influence of industry lawyers on government lawyers. The dynamic
has to do with the increasingly infamous and lucrative “revolving
door” in corporate crime law practice, but the point is subtler than the
85. See Arlen, supra note 57, at 213–14; Carol Morello & Carol D. Leonnig, Christie
Has History of Pushing Limits, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2014, at A1, A10; Philip Shenon,
Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2008, at A1.
86. Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., to Heads of
Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys (Mar. 7, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminalresource-manual-163-selection-and-use-monitors [https://perma.cc/6SZB-HD45].
87. The definitive account is William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001) (discussing how politics drive the broadening of
criminal law and expansion of prosecutorial discretion).

96 N.C. L. REV. 823 (2018)

846

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96

claim that prosecutors seek to please the corporate defense bar so
that it will hire them.88
Speculation is required here because the point is likely
impossible to observe empirically. There is a shared view within the
corporate crime bar—prosecutors and defense lawyers alike who, of
course, do switch sides and work together with regularity—that the
practice of corporate criminal enforcement requires a transparency
and predictability that is not demanded in other areas of criminal
prosecution. I do not think this belief is primarily motivated by a
tendency to collude in order to keep each other fully employed. It
likely has something to do with a shared sense that the bar in this area
is involved in a kind of economic regulation—a practice that has
wider policy implications—that does not apply in other areas of
criminal enforcement. Perhaps this shared culture stems from a belief
that the subjects of criminal enforcement in this area, especially the
corporations themselves, are for the most part law-abiding legal
persons engaged in legitimate activities and therefore, must be
treated with a level of care and given a degree of notice and clarity
that are not demanded elsewhere in criminal law.
Of course, many would say that this notion is a pathology:
corporations should be treated like ordinary criminals, and
disadvantaged offenders should get all the informal process that
corporations receive.89 But that is a normative point. Descriptively,
what we might call the “culture of the conference room” in the
practice of corporate crime is both more complicated in its origins
than some think and more powerful in how it influences the
willingness of prosecutors, indeed their sense of obligation, to explain
what they are doing.
It would be easy to miss this final point because it seems that
federal prosecutors and the corporate defense bar constantly disagree
about both law and policy when it comes to corporate crime. But this
is skirmishing at most, just something to talk about at the least.
Indeed, the continual conversation—not just in conference rooms but
in the newspapers and bar journals, at endless conferences on the
subject, in congressional testimony, and in law reviews—is evidence
that the bar as a whole agrees that this is an appropriate area for
88. See BUELL, supra note 69, at 176–203; Harvey Silverglate, The Revolving Door at
the Department of Justice, FORBES (June 22, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/harveysilverglate/2011/06/22/revolving-door/#4e4b54f25bf9 [https://perma.cc/3BC8-R7VN].
89. Cf. Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of
Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1297 (2001) (arguing that wrongdoing in a
corporate setting is treated differently from wrongdoing on the street).
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policymaking dialogue. Imagine the shock if an assistant attorney
general were to walk into the next conference on corporate crime and
say, “Game over, folks, and we are taking the ball with us. From now
on, you will get as much information about what we are doing as the
John Gottis and Pablo Escobars of the world.” Federal prosecutors
have fully internalized the (albeit controversial) idea that corporate
prosecution is a form of industry regulation.
F.

To Produce More Evidence

In individual prosecutions that are parts of larger investigations,
a prosecutor’s use of a “speaking indictment,” as well as other types
of detailed court filings, often has a strategic purpose. By describing
allegations in terms of what the prosecutor’s evidence, including
witnesses and documents, shows, the prosecutor hopes to encourage
the charged defendant, as well as others charged and uncharged, that
litigation is likely to fail and that cooperating with the government is
the wisest course. In other words, the prosecutor discloses
information about the prosecutor’s case in the hopes of strengthening
the case. In the prosecutor’s best scenario, a series of such disclosures
as charges are rung up in an ongoing campaign against, for example,
the mafia or a drug cartel creates a cascade effect in which newly
arrested or even confronted subjects quickly “flip,” believing
resistance to be futile.
There might be some of this motivation in disclosing information
about corporate prosecutions, but not likely as much. In an
investigation involving multiple firms in a single industry, a
prosecutor might think that disclosure of a strong case against one
corporation could make others more pliable. For example, this could
have been driving some of the fanfare around initial settlements in
the LIBOR and FX currency trading scandals, and perhaps also in the
government’s civil settlements with the large banks for mortgagebacked securities trading under the FIRREA statute.90 A prosecutor

90. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank PLC Admits Misconduct
Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro Interbank
Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 2012),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/barclays-bank-plc-admits-misconduct-related-submissionslondon-interbank-offered-rate-and [https://perma.cc/32WD-T5JY]; Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure Record $13
Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About Securities
Containing Toxic Mortgages (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-federal-and-state-partners-secure-record-13-billion-global-settlement [https://perma.cc
/ET3H-472B]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-
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might think that disclosure of details in a corporate settlement could
motivate defendants and witnesses to offer testimony as the
government pursues individual prosecutions in the wake of the
settlement. My own impression is that these strategic motivations
tend to be swamped by the prosecutor’s stronger desire to send the
usual broader policy messages about deterring corporate crime.
G. To Serve the Purposes of Punishment
Federal prosecutors undoubtedly would say that the analysis to
this point over-complicates things: they talk a lot about corporate
crime because that is how one achieves the policy objectives of
criminal law in this field. The DOJ’s written policies on corporate
prosecutions are explicit in announcing the government’s objectives:
to promote “good corporate citizenship”; to obtain deterrence on a
wide scale; to reform criminogenic institutions; to help make victims
whole; and the like.91 The best-known part of those policies—the ten
factors that are meant to guide the decision whether to charge a
corporation—are in large part an effort to fit ordinary thinking about
criminal punishment to the odd case of the business institution.92
Prosecutors must weigh the seriousness and extent of the wrongdoing,
the corporation’s tendency toward recidivism, and the corporation’s
contrition (in the form of cooperation, remedial effort, and reform).93
When it comes to both charging and sentencing, prosecutors are
meant to think about these sorts of things in any criminal case.
It is clearly the view of the DOJ, as well as many who think
about white collar crime, that the business sector is fertile ground for
the criminal law to send messages. On this account, white collar
criminals pay more attention than “street” offenders to what the law
and the government are doing, and they use that information more
self-consciously to plan their activities.94 “This is great,” thinks the
Level Guilty Pleas (May 20, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-major-banks-agreeparent-level-guilty-pleas [https://perma.cc/EE6L-9X7Q].
91. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at § 9-28.200.
92. Id. § 9-28.300.
93. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-27.000 (2017),
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution [https://perma.cc
/6627-4WJZ].
94. See Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 409, 411 (1980) (“[T]here is no money equivalent to the pain of
imprisonment, perhaps especially to the affluent, educated, ‘sensitive’ person—the whitecollar criminal”); Online Extra: A Talk with Justice’s No. 2, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Feb. 23, 2004), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2004-02-22/online-extra-a-talkwith-justices-no-dot-2 [http://perma.cc/FML7-65QJ] (noting that white-collar criminals are
“exquisitely sensitive to pain”).
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jaundiced prosecutor who sees first-hand the parade of recidivists
through the system in drug, gun, and organized crime cases. “Here is
an area where the basic theories of punishment might actually work!”
Starting with the most defendant-centric theories, the DOJ
believes its corporate prosecution program, perhaps above all, is
designed to send a strong message—even a message that
stigmatizes—to the corporate defendant itself. The purposes of this
message are to punish the defendant, including through negative
publicity, to deter the corporate defendant from committing (or
perhaps better, allowing) future violations of law, and to rehabilitate
the defendant so that it promotes legal compliance in the future.95
It has long been a DOJ practice in the settlement of a corporate
prosecution, whether or not it involves a guilty plea, to require at
least a defendant’s factual, if not also legal, admission to
wrongdoing.96 That admission, together with a detailed statement of
facts and an announcement of financial and other penalties, is
broadcast in publicly available documents that are disseminated
widely, at least in cases involving large corporations.
One might think that publicity is not necessary when a
prosecution seeks to impose retribution and obtain specific
deterrence because the defendant is already paying attention. But
even within the confines of a large corporation, public and
widespread disclosure of the nature of the wrongdoing, the penalties,
and the rehabilitative measures imposed can garner the attention of
the many stakeholders in the corporation who may be spread around
the world. And the publicity itself is part of the punishment: it may
impose a reputational consequence on the firm, and even to some
extent on its managers, that has the potential to discourage future
episodes of wrongdoing.97 Requiring a firm to admit wrongdoing in a
highly publicized setting may contribute to the seriousness with which
stakeholders view the problem, promoting introspection and reform.98
95. See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the Potential for
Rehabilitation, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (2009).
96. For a comprehensive collection of such settlements over time, see Garrett &
Ashley, supra note 9.
97. See Buell, supra note 29, at 491–525; see also Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature
of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 491
(1999); Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87
B.U. L. REV. 1021, 1025 (2007); Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin,
The Consequences to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 194
(2008); Jonathan M. Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Cost to Firms of
Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008).
98. See Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public
Enforcement of Law, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 505, 513 (2014); Verity Winship & Jennifer K.
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Thus, disclosure of the prosecutor’s case and of the justifications for
her actions may have a role to play in corporate crime that is missing,
or at least less present, in “ordinary” criminal cases.
The DOJ’s primary and openly professed ambition in
prosecuting corporate crime is to reduce the incidence of corporate
crime, principally by encouraging corporate managers to take steps to
prevent or reduce wrongdoing by employees. 99 Regular and
widespread disclosure of both the details of enforcement actions and
of policy guidance can be viewed as central, even essential, to the
pursuit of this objective. The DOJ’s persistent public emphasis on the
benefits to corporations, in both charging discretion and penalties,
from cooperation, self-reporting, and vigorous compliance
programs—an emphasis which has been sharpened by recent policies
in FCPA enforcement—is designed to send a strong message. That
message is that corporations should police their employees, both to
prevent crime in the first instance and to ensure that wrongdoers are
punished in the second instance, and it will be expensive to fail to do
so.100
The DOJ has wholeheartedly adopted the deterrence theory of
corporate criminal liability advocated by utilitarian theorists who
defend the idea of using criminal processes against corporations.101
The Department’s commitment to this theory has only grown
stronger over time, as it has increased both the extent of its policy
pronouncements on the subject102 and, more substantially, the extent
to which its settlement documents speak at length about the
defendant corporation’s efforts, or lack thereof, at compliance,
cooperation, and reform.103 In the area of corporate prosecutions,
federal prosecutors are engaged in a campaign to, in effect, regulate
corporate legal compliance—at least as it relates to compliance with
federal criminal law.104 Obviously, the success of such an effort would
Robbennolt, Admissions of Guilt in Civil Enforcement, 101 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018) (manuscript at 31), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2942279
[https://perma.cc/QS2R-VLWD].
99. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to All U.S. Attorneys et al., Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc
/TE9B-CGSR].
100. See id.
101. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Conduct: An
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 691 (1997).
102. Supra Section I.C.
103. Supra Section II.F.
104. See Lisa Kern Griffin, Inside-Out Enforcement, in PROSECUTORS IN THE
BOARDROOM, supra note 10, at 110, 122; Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The
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depend, at least in large part, on the government’s ability to
disseminate its messages throughout particular industries and the
corporate sector as a whole.105
III. WHAT SHOULD WE WANT PROSECUTORS TO SAY?
In discussions about the American criminal justice system, which
is now dominated and pervaded by prosecutorial discretion, a
common call is for “accountability” of prosecutors.106 This demand
needs much specification. In the most general sense, I take it to mean
that prosecutors ought to be required to exercise their discretion in
the public interest and that there ought to be mechanisms for holding
them to that obligation. This, however, leaves a lot to be explained in
terms of what the public interest is and how prosecutors might be
held to it.
With respect to corporate crime, it seems reasonable to think
that federal prosecutors would understand their duty to include
reducing the incidence of criminal violations by employees of large
corporations, when cost effective. While deterrence of crime is a
notoriously difficult subject for empirical proof,107 the government’s
basic theory of corporate crime over the last two decades—using the
threat of criminal prosecution to leverage the power of corporations
over their employees to prevent and detect individual crimes—is
plausible. Whether the DOJ’s contemporary approach is the optimal
program for dealing with corporate crime is, of course, hotly debated,
and it is not the purpose of this Essay to take up that controversy.108
Assume that enforcement realities guarantee that the
government will continue to depend on its power over corporations as

New Role of the Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 23, 25
(2010).
105. See Dorothy Thornton, Neil A. Gunningham & Robert A. Kagan, General
Deterrence & Corporate Environmental Behavior, 27 LAW & POL’Y 262, 277–81 (2005).
106. See Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for
Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1589 (2010) (pointing to a deficiency in
prosecutorial accountability in the United States and the need for “[a] responsible exercise
of power . . . consistent with current public preferences and with fundamental, long-term
legal principles”).
107. See Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the
Literature, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 5, 6 (2017).
108. See, e.g., Arlen & Kahan, supra note 10, at 373 (“Prosecutors are trained to think
about what is needed to make sure crime does not happen. But this is not, and should not
be, the standard employed to establish ‘effective’ or ‘reasonable’ compliance. Compliance
is costly.”).
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one of its principal means of deterring and detecting business crime.109
Determining whether prosecutors make decisions and take actions in
this area in furtherance of a good faith and reasonably effective effort
along these lines depends on having information about what they are
doing and, to at least some extent, what they are thinking.
Accountability depends on transparency, sunlight disinfects, and so
on. Particularly because the topic of how corporate crime ought to be
treated in the criminal justice system is so controversial—including on
the very question of what is a crime in the first place—this field
demands regular public justification for prosecutorial decisions.
Transparency, however, is not an unalterable good. In criminal
enforcement, secrecy is often necessary to the acquisition of evidence
because individuals engaged in wrongdoing work to conceal their
activities. Evidence, it goes without saying, is the essence of a
successful prosecution. In addition, in an adversarial system—and
prosecutors of corporate crime face the best adversaries in criminal
practice—over-sharing of information and strategy can lead to defeat
at the hands of skilled counsel, including in cases that, on their merits,
ought to have resulted in punishment. Badly motivated corporate
managers might also use the government’s disclosures about how it
makes its corporate cases, and how it exercises its charging and
sanctioning discretion, as a roadmap for unlawful activities designed
to evade legal sanction.
Not surprisingly, then, the conclusion here is that prosecutors
talking publicly about corporate criminal enforcement has some good
reasons and desirable effects but also some unattractive motivations
and potential downsides. Disclosure designed to deter corporate
crime should be welcomed when its benefits exceed its drawbacks in
hampering effective enforcement. Disclosure meant to further the
professional ambitions of prosecutors, however, has no value. Nor is it
clear that the public has any real interest in disclosure that is designed
only to foster legitimacy—the idea that prosecutors are doing their
job—whether that idea is encouraged among the public generally or
more specifically with observers in Congress.

109. See BUELL, supra note 699, at 154–55; see also ANDREW WEISSMANN ET. AL.,
U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, REFORMING CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY TO PROMOTE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE BEHAVIOR 2 (2008),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/WeissmannPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc
/ADX3-Q32X] (“For many corporations, a criminal indictment is tantamount to a
corporate death penalty and thus the current standard for corporate criminal liability
places disproportionate power in the hands of the government.”).
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Whether the public realizes it or not, the public’s agenda is
corporate criminal enforcement, not the politics of corporate crime.
Consider a recent example, one that happens to have mostly involved
the prosecution of individuals, not firms. The U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York determined the prosecutions
stemming from the 2008 financial crisis constituted “the biggest
insider trading bust since the infamous Ivan Boesky case back in the
1980s,” which “at the time [was] the largest crackdown ever on white
collar crime.”110 This wave of prosecutions attracted a great deal of
press, most of which was encouraged by the U.S. Attorney.111 No
doubt one objective of publicity in this context was to create the
impression that miscreant traders in the hedge fund industry will get
caught and punished, and thus deter insider trading.112 One cannot
measure deterrent effect in this context because the incidence of
insider trading is not observable. But it is more than reasonable to
think that eighty prosecutions involving wiretaps, informants, and
cooperating witnesses, where previously there had been only sporadic
criminal enforcement, had some chilling effect on the relevant
criminal activity.
At the same time, even if he doubted the deterrent value in
doing so, then-U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York
Preet Bharara surely would have been eager to publicize his antiinsider trading campaign. Indeed, at one point in the campaign he
declared insider trading to be “rampant” on Wall Street,113 a message
110. CHARLES GASPARINO, CIRCLE OF FRIENDS: THE MASSIVE FEDERAL
CRACKDOWN ON INSIDER TRADING 104, 224 (2013); see Jesse Eisinger, Why Only One
Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 30, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/YNQ8-6C6C (staff-uploaded archive)].
111. See, e.g., Massimo Calabresi & Bill Saporito, The Street Fighter, TIME, Feb. 13,
2012; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District
of New York Recovers Nearly $4 Billion from Criminal and Civil Cases Since January
2013 (Feb. 11, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/February14
/Collections2013PR.php [https://perma.cc/N8EL-K3WN] (discussing the wave of
prosecutions for insider trading); see also Sonam Sheth, Donald Trump Just Fired Preet
Bharara – Here’s a Look at the Sheriff of Wall Street’s Most High-Profile Cases, BUS.
INSIDER (Mar. 11, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/preet-bharara-trump-fired-highprofile-cases-2017-3 [https://perma.cc/8GDC-HV4M]; U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara
Addresses Insider Trading Prosecutions, Public Corruption at Milbank Tweed Forum,
NYU LAW (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/us-attorney-preet-bharara-insidertrading-prosecutions-milbank-tweed-forum [https://perma.cc/LKP3-44TF].
112. The revelation that wiretaps were being used in this area for the first time had to
have been a particularly informative moment, causing potential violators to exercise much
more caution in sharing tips about inside information.
113. Peter Lattman, U.S. Is Said to Pursue Broad Insider Trading Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2010, at 24.
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that might perversely have encouraged the belief that most violators
still were not being caught and thus the risk of prosecution remained
low. He also must have thought that publicizing his efforts, at a time
when the anti-Wall Street sentiment was at one of its all-time highs,
would cause the public to believe there was an active sheriff on the
financial crime beat. This would perhaps calm the outrage a bit and,
in terms of the strange theology of market regulation, perhaps
“restore public faith in the markets” so that the capital would keep on
flowing.114 It might also, of course, identify him personally as the guy
cracking down on business crime.115
Moving to specific forms of disclosure that have been discussed
in this Essay, I suggest that the conclusion might be the opposite of
what was expected. Objective analysis might be expected to wind up
favoring the careful and regular policy pronouncement over the
splashy revelation of the details of one corporate crime or another.
Again, it is the policy material—the DOJ’s pre-commitment in
writing on matters of discretion—that the defense bar and many
academic commentators have persistently clamored for, and which
the government has periodically provided in part to satisfy those
constituencies.116
But there is reason to be skeptical of whether policy memos,
guidelines, and the like are the best evidence of what prosecutors do,
and will do in the future, and of their reasoning and motivations.
There are many audiences for such policy pronouncements, the last
among which might be the people who actually contemplate whether
to commit corporate crime. Indeed, some observers have sharply
questioned whether the obsessive focus in these documents on
compliance programs, as well as the similar focus in the corporate
sentencing guidelines, promotes a wasteful compliance industry that
expensively elevates form over substance in the management of large
firms. 117 Not only does this serve the interests of prosecutors in
legitimizing what they are doing by making it seem more law-like and
more driven by policy objectives, but also it serves the interests of the
114. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006).
115. If intended, this worked; Bharara landed on the cover of Time Magazine.
Calabresi & Saporito, supra note 111.
116. See Arlen & Kahan, supra note 10, at 327 (“Calls abound for federal authorities to
provide adequate guidance to prosecutors on when to impose [criminal settlement]
mandates and what form they should take.”); see also sources cited, id. at 327 n.9.
117. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 490 (2003); see also Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing
Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 954 (2009).
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private bar and related professionals who sell their services to
corporations on the claim that their expertise can help companies
avoid trouble with the DOJ.
An example to be especially skeptical about is the recent Yates
Memo. The DOJ revised its corporate prosecution guidelines to insert
lots of additional language about the importance of prosecuting
individuals in corporate cases and not substituting a corporate
settlement for charging individual violators. 118 The guidelines had
never said anything about not charging individuals, and the DOJ had
never described itself as uninterested in that objective. But legal and
media commentators, as well as some members of Congress, had been
complaining in the wake of the financial crisis that the Department
had lost its appetite for individual white-collar prosecutions. 119
Prosecutors, especially federal prosecutors, cannot stand to be called
lazy. And it may have been true that senior officials in the DOJ were
aware of individual examples in which line prosecutors had walked
away from corporate settlements without showing enough zeal about
following up on individual prosecutions—or, even worse, implicitly
traded a corporate settlement for a decision to stand down on
individuals.
So the DOJ issued a policy memo, with an extensive media
rollout, that changes virtually nothing about the realities of corporate
crime prosecution. The Yates Memo keeps saying to try harder to
pursue individual prosecutions.120 But it does not address the most
common reason that individual prosecutions fail or never get off the
ground in the first place: the criminal laws of the United States and
the nature of the large corporate institution combine to make it
extremely difficult in all but the most flagrant cases of corporate
crime to succeed in assigning liability to individual corporate
managers.121 The DOJ knows this better than anyone, especially in
the wake of the mortgage-backed securities trading fiasco.
118. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at §§ 9-28.210, .300; Memorandum from
Sally Quillian Yates, supra note 99.
119. See, e.g., Chris Arnold, After Five Years, Why So Few Charges in Financial Crisis?,
NPR (July 26, 2013, 4:55 PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/07/26/205866019/few-on-wallstreet-have-been-prosecuted-for-financial-crisis [https://perma.cc/X9H9-PBAZ (staffuploaded archive)].
120. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, supra note 99.
121. For more extensive discussion, see Samuel W. Buell, Criminally Bad Management
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE CRIME AND FINANCIAL MISDEALING (J.
Arlen ed., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Samuel W. Buell, The Responsibility Gap in Corporate Crime, CRIM. LAW & PHIL. (July
31,
2017),
https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs11572-017-9434-9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DV33-VKK6 (staff-uploaded archive)].
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The DOJ also well knows (because it invented the practice) that
the credible threat to impose criminal liability on corporations, not
individuals, is the principal means by which the DOJ obtains evidence
of crimes within large corporations.122 Indeed, to the extent that the
Yates Memo has any hard edges, they are about corporate, not
individual, liability: the memo instructs prosecutors that they may not
give a corporation credit for cooperation unless and until the
company has done everything it can to give the DOJ provable cases
against employees. 123 Thus the Yates Memo can be read as a
somewhat cynical, or at least cute, response to the years of criticism of
the DOJ for supposed weakness on prosecuting executives, especially
in the financial sector. Even though the memo could do nothing about
law or problems of proof, it seems to have spurred a mild panic in
some private quarters that the government is really coming to take
lots of management scalps.124
When it comes to federal prosecutors, we should watch what
they do, not what they say. The growing phenomenon of the
“speaking settlement” is to be warmly welcomed and further
encouraged. Give us lots of detail about the nature of the underlying
wrongdoing and the strength of the case: who was involved, what was
done, where it occurred, how long it lasted, and so on. Be specific.
And always get an admission so the facts become a lasting and
indisputable record of the case. Put numbers on things whenever
possible. Tell the public what the sanctions are going to be and how
they were calculated. Describe in detail the extent to which the crimes
were or were not attributable to corporate culture, compliance
programs, management directives, and the like—explain how it was a
case of corporate crime, not just respondeat superior liability.
Quantitatively or qualitatively, score the quality of a company’s
efforts at remediation and cooperation relative to other cases. Tell the
public how prosecutors reasoned their way to this particular
122. See First, supra note 104, at 87–88.
123. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, supra note 99.
124. See, e.g., Government & Internal Investigations Advisory: The Yates Memo and the
DOJ’s Focus on Individuals, ALSTON & BIRD (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.alston.com
/advisories/DOJ-yates-memo/ [https://perma.cc/ZT49-7KT3]; Legal Issues Business
Leaders Need to Know in 2016, ARNALL GOLDEN GREGORY (2016), http://www.agg.com
/files/Publication/b22380dd-68ac-4249-a9ad-16073de65b33/Presentation/PublicationAttachment
/c7a8777d-66de-4daa-9bdc-16fc367a91d0/AGG-Business-Leaders-Legal-Issues-2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2BAB-TFJA]; The Yates Memo—A Renewed US Focus on Individual
Misconduct in Corporate Investigations, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (June 2016),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/140884/the-yates-memo-arenewed-us-focus-on-individual-misconduct-in-corporate-investigations [https://perma.cc
/Z683-68GF].
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settlement.125 And when possible—perhaps this is asking too much—
get the company to agree to disclose its own investigative report on
the wrongdoing.126
What we get through this disclosure mechanism is not the bland
language of unenforceable policy pronouncements but a kind of
common law of corporate enforcement—a body of case law, if you
like, that we can read and study. We get empirical data, the lack of
which has been the biggest barrier to rigorous study of the most
important phenomenon in the present American criminal justice
system: how and why prosecutors wield their power.127 If lawyers and
academics can begin to tell crisper-edged stories about what the DOJ
has been doing from case to case in the enforcement of criminal law
against corporations, clearer messages might emerge about how to
comply with the law, and greater transparency will exist about
whether the DOJ’s actions are serving the public interest.128 If the
DOJ is going to continue to issue policy statements about corporate
crime, those statements should tell federal prosecutors what they
must file or disclose when they settle a case and specifically what
those documents must say about both the wrongdoing and the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in response to that wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION
The enormous and mostly unreviewable power that federal
prosecutors exercise in a process dominated by settlements warrants
ample skepticism about the motivations underlying what they choose
to disclose and say. But it remains remarkable, and in need of
explanation, that there is so much more disclosure and speaking in
the field of corporate crime than in any other area of federal
prosecution. Professional self-interest and Washington politics may
125. Cunningham, supra note 10, at 48–56; Wilt, supra note 2, at 64; see also Beverly
Earle & Anita Cava, The Mystery of Declinations Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:
A Proposal to Incentivize Compliance, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 567, 569 (2015).
126. The reports in cases like the General Motors ignition switch scandal have been
valuable resources. See ANTON VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF
GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS, JENNER &
BLOCK (2014), https://www.beasleyallen.com/webfiles/valukas-report-on-gm-redacted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DQ6Z-UMLB].
127. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 128
(2008) (asserting that many believe prosecutorial discretion is the “opposite of law” and
has “ripple effects throughout the criminal justice system”).
128. In other words, the objective should be to encourage and feed the work of
analysts such as Cindy Alexander and Mark Cohen. See generally Alexander & Cohen,
supra note 34 (discussing the transformation in corporate criminal law enforcement
through the use of DPAs and NPAs).
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explain some of this behavior, but the effort to accomplish something
programmatically likely explains more of it.
This behavior has the potential to benefit the public. It is to be
encouraged and, if possible, channeled. In particular, case-specific
information over a large number of cases has greater value than
policy boilerplate. A prosecutor’s description of facts that a firm
agrees to as a condition of settlement cannot fully substitute for what
might be learned through full-blown litigation and trial. But
settlement will continue to dominate for the foreseeable future, and
those of us who wish to study and debate the practice of corporate
criminal enforcement should encourage more of what we can get.

